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Religious Freedom and the European Court of Human Rights’ Two 
Margins of Appreciation  
 
Stephanie E. Berry 




The European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) use of the margin of appreciation (MoA) in cases 
concerning religious clothing is well-documented. This article paints a more complete picture of the 
use of the doctrine in cases falling within Article 9 and Article 2, Protocol 1 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The ECtHR’s use of the normative MoA often appears to be 
superfluous as is does not appear to extend past the Article 9(2) ECHR, limitations clause. In contrast, 
the systemic MoA allows almost complete deference to the State, which has the potential to 
undermine the religious freedom of minorities. 
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In the Kokkinakis decision, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) accepted that in 
the context of Article 9 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),1 ‘a certain margin 
of appreciation is to be left to the Contracting States in assessing the existence and extent of 
                                                




the necessity of an interference’.2 The ECtHR has, subsequently, accepted that States have a 
wide margin of appreciation (MoA) in relation to the freedom of religion or belief on the 
basis of a lack of consensus.3 The MoA gives effect to the principle of subsidiary within the 
ECtHR’s case law.4  
 The use of the MoA under Article 9 ECHR is well documented, particularly in the 
context of restrictions placed on religious clothing.5 On the one hand, its use has been lauded 
for acknowledging the ECtHR’s limitations as an international mechanism of adjudication 
and, specifically, that national authorities may be better placed to determine the appropriate 
course of action in a given set of circumstances.6 On the other hand, academics have often 
viewed the ECtHR’s deference to the MoA as an abrogation of the ECtHR’s duties,7 on the 
basis that it fails to recognise the deficiencies inherent in democracy.8  
 Alongside these competing views of the desirability of the MoA, academics have also 
struggled to conceptualise the MoA in manner that fully captures the range of contexts in 
which it has been deployed. Nonetheless, it is widely accepted that in practice there are two 
formulations of the MoA: the normative MoA and the systemic MoA.9 The normative MoA 
refers to deference on the basis of merits-related reasons, specifically, when States have 
                                                
2 Kokkinakis v. Greece, 25 May 1993, European Court of Human Rights, No. 14307/88, para 47. 
3 Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, 27 June 2000, European Court of Human Rights, No. 27417/95, para. 
84; Leyla Șahın v. Turkey, 10 November 2005, European Court of Human Rights, No. 44774/98, para. 109. 
4 Article 1 of Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms CETS No. 213 opened for signature, 24 June 2013, not yet in force. 
5 See, for example, Malcolm D. Evans, ‘Freedom of Religion and the European Convention on Human Rights; 
Approaches, Trends and Tensions’, in P. Cane, C. Evans, and Z. Robinson (eds.), Law and Religion in 
Theoretical and Historical Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 291-314; Carolyn 
Evans, ‘The “Islamic Scarf” in the European Court of Human Rights’, 7:1 Melbourne Journal of International 
Law (2006), pp. 52–73; Tom Lewis, ‘What Not to Wear: Religious Rights, the European Court and the Margin 
of Appreciation’, 56:2 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2007), pp. 395-414. 
6 Robert. Spano, ‘Universality or Diversity of Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of Subsidiarity’, 14 Human 
Rights Law Review (2014), p. 499; Dominic McGoldrick, ‘A Defence of the Margin of Appreciation and an 
Argument for its Application by the Human Rights Committee’, 65 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly (2016), p. 33.  
7 Dimitrios Tsarapatsanis, ‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: A Low-Level Institutional View’, 35 Legal 
Studies (2015), p. 676. 
8 Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards’, 31 New York University 
Journal of International Law and Policy (1998-1999), p. 853.  
9 Oddný M Arnadóttir, ‘Rethinking the Two Margins of Appreciation’, 12 European Constitutional Law Review 
(2016), pp. 27-53. 
 
 
sought to strike a balance between Article 9 ECHR and a competing right or collective goal.10 
It may also refer to the interpretation or application of rights at a domestic level.11 In contrast, 
the systemic MoA recognises the limitations of the ECtHR’s powers of review and results in 
deference to States on the basis of ‘a functional or pragmatic rationale related to the different 
competences of different actors in the European system for the protection of human rights’.12 
Thus, Letsas understands the structural MoA as being rooted in State sovereignty and the 
principle that the ECtHR must not act as a Court of Fourth Instance.13 The boundaries 
between these two formulations of the MoA are not clear14 and, indeed, Arnadóttir submits 
that ‘[t]he systemic and the normative elements of the margin of appreciation can intersect in 
various ways within the same case’.15 
 It is from this starting point that this article traces the justifications for and 
circumstances in which the ECtHR has accepted that States have a MoA in cases concerning 
the right to manifest religion. Given the close link between Article 9 ECHR and Article 2 
Protocol 1 ECHR16 both rights will be considered together. A full exploration of the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence in this field reveals that the lack of consensus relating to Church-State relations 
is but one justification for the adoption of the MoA. It is argued that while the normative 
MoA does not seem to extend significantly past the limitations contained in Article 9(2) 
ECHR, the systemic MoA permits almost complete deference. This is problematic as 
restrictions on freedom of religion or belief predominantly impact religious minorities and 
                                                
10 George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), p. 85. 
11 Jan Kratochivíl, ‘The Inflation of the Margin of Appreciation by the European Court of Human Rights’, 29 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights (2011), p. 328.  
12 Arnadóttir supra note 9, p. 52. See also, George Letsas, ‘Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation’, 26 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2006), p. 706. 
13 Letsas, supra note 10, p. 85. 
14 Kratochivíl, supra note 11, p. 332.  
15 Arnadóttir supra note 9, p. 53. 
16 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, CETS 009, 
entered into force 18 May 1954.  
 
 
the systemic MOA, in particular, has the potential to defer to majoritarian preferences, in 
disregard of the deficiencies inherent in democratic decision-making.  
 
 
2 Lack of Consensus 
 
In Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek the ECtHR accepted that States have a MoA ‘with regard to 
establishment of the delicate relations between the Churches and the State’.17 In Șahın, it 
further elaborated that on the basis of the lack of consensus in this area ‘the role of the 
national decision-making body must be given special importance’.18 The secular or Christian 
traditions of the State have been accepted by the ECtHR to justify a wide MoA under Article 
9 ECHR as there is a lack of consensus in relation to Church-State relations. Interferences 
with Article 9 ECHR on the basis of secularism all concern religious clothing,19 whereas the 
MoA on the basis of Christian traditions has primarily been recognised in the educational 
context.20 Deference on this basis is not absolute. Although States have a wide MoA, this 
must be consistent with the role of the State as the ‘neutral and impartial organiser of the 
exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs’.21 Notably, the width of the MoA available to 
States appears to differ according to which tradition is invoked.  
 In the context of cases concerning religious clothing, the ECtHR has been criticised 
for approaching secularism as unproblematic. For example, Carolyn Evans has argued that 
                                                
17 Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek para. 84 [sic]. 
18 Șahın, para.109. 
19 Ibid.; Dahlab v. Switzerland, 15 February 2001, European Court of Human Rights, No. 42393/98; Dogru v. 
France, 4 December 2008, European Court of Human Rights, No. 27058/05; Ebrahimian v. France, 26 
November 2015, European Court of Human Rights, No. 64846/11. 
20 Folgerø and others v. Norway, 29 June 2007, European Court of Human Rights, No. 15472/02; Lautsi and 
others v. Italy, 18 March 2011, European Court of Human Rights, No. 30814/06. 
21 Șahın para.107. 
 
 
‘[i]n the headscarf cases, the Court ... does not question the elevated position of secularism’.22 
In practice, the ECtHR has uncritically accepted that restrictions on an individual’s freedom 
of religion in the name of secularism fall within the State’s MoA,23 as secularism is presumed 
to be compatible with the role of the State as ‘neutral and impartial organiser.24 This lack of 
scrutiny suggests that deference on the basis of secularism is not based on merits-related 
reasons (the normative MoA). Instead, it is suggested that the MoA in cases concerning 
secularism appears to be justified by democratic and constitutional reasons. For example, in 
Dogru, the ECtHR justified the MoA on the basis that ‘in France, as in Turkey or 
Switzerland, secularism is a constitutional principle, and a founding principle of the 
Republic, to which the entire population adheres and the protection of which appears to be of 
prime importance, in particular in schools’.25 Similarly, in Șahın, the ECtHR deferred to the 
State’s MoA and accepted that secularism ‘may be considered necessary to protect the 
democratic system in Turkey’.26 This leads to the conclusion that the MoA in these cases is 
systemic rather than normative in nature. 
 The ECtHR has also accepted that States with a Christian tradition have a MoA on the 
basis of the same lack of consensus. In Folgerø and Others, the ECtHR was willing to accept 
that the prioritisation of Christianity within the religious education syllabus fell within the 
State’s MoA ‘[i]n view of the place occupied by Christianity in the national history and 
tradition of the respondent State’.27 Similarly, in Lautsi, the Grand Chamber held that ‘the 
decision whether or not to perpetuate a tradition falls in principle within the margin of 
                                                
22 Carolyn Evans, ‘Individual and Group Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights: Cracks in 
the Intellectual Architecture’ 26 Journal of Law and Religion (2010-2011), p. 336. 
23 Stephanie E. Berry, ‘A "Good Faith" Interpretation of the Right to Manifest Religion? The Diverging 
Approaches of the European Court of Human Rights and UN Human Rights Committee’, forthcoming in Legal 
Studies (2017).  
24 Ibid.  
25 Dogru, para. 72.  
26 Șahın, para. 114. 
27 Folgerø, para. 89.  
 
 
appreciation of the respondent State’. 28  However, in Lautsi, the Grand Chamber also 
observed that ‘that the reference to a tradition cannot relieve a Contracting State of its 
obligation to respect the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention and its Protocols.’29 
Indeed, the MoA in relation to Christian traditions appears to be narrower than in cases 
concerning secularism. Rather than accepting that restrictions are prima facie legitimate, the 
ECtHR considers whether the State has struck an appropriate balance. In Folgerø, despite the 
State’s MoA, the ECtHR carried out a detailed analysis of the religious education syllabus 
and concluded that it was incompatible with the State’s role as a ‘neutral and impartial 
organiser’.30 Thus, as the merits of the case are considered, a normative MoA is employed in 
cases concerning Christian traditions.  
 It is notable that in the analogous case of Zengın, which concerned the content of the 
religious education syllabus in Turkey, the ECtHR did not recognise that the State had a 
MoA concerning Islamic traditions.31 Given that the ECtHR carried out a similar level of 
analysis in Zengın as in Følgero, this suggests that the reference to the MoA in Følgero was 
unnecessary.32 However, it also suggests that the scope of the MoA permitted on the basis of 
national traditions is contingent upon the extent to which those traditions are perceived by the 
ECtHR to be consistent with the role of the State as ‘the neutral and impartial organiser’. The 
ECtHR has found Islam to be incompatible with both the values underpinning the Convention 
and the requirements of ‘neutrality and impartiality’.33 Thus, while the ECtHR is happy to 
afford secular and Christian States a MoA on the basis of a ‘lack of consensus’, it seems 
unlikely that this will be extended to States with a majority Muslim population.  
                                                
28 Lautsi, para. 68. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Folgerø, paras. 95-100.  
31 Hasan and Eylem Zengın v. Turkey, 9 October 2007, European Court of Human Rights, No. 1448/04. 
32 Kristin Henrard, ‘How the European Court of Human Rights’ Concern Regarding European Consensus 
Tempers the Effective Protection of Freedom of Religion’, 4 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (2015), p. 409. 
33 Refah Partısı (The Welfare Party) and others v. Turkey, 13 February 2003, European Court of Human Rights, 





3 Reconciling the Interests of Various Religious Groups 
 
In Kokkinakis, the ECtHR accepted that ‘in democratic societies, in which several religions 
coexist within one and the same population, it may be necessary to place restrictions on this 
freedom in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s 
beliefs are respected’.34 Thus, the ECtHR has accepted that States have a MoA to restrict 
individual religious freedom in order to protect religious pluralism and harmony.35 Secular 
policies are consistently accepted to be consistent with this aim. 36  Nonetheless, such 
measures must again align with the role of the State as the ‘neutral and impartial organiser’. 
Consequently, in the context of registration requirements for religious communities, the 
ECtHR has found that States have overstepped their MoA if they deny official status on 
arbitrary or discriminatory grounds. 37  Furthermore, while registration requirements are 
consistent with Article 9 ECHR, the failure of a religious community to register does not 
permit the State to interfere with the individual exercise of this right. Consequently, in 
Masaev, the State had overstepped its MoA by prosecuting individuals for practicing an 
unregistered religion.38  
 This MoA does not permit the State to interfere with religious matters in order to 
resolve intra-religious disputes. The principle that the State is ‘impartial and neutral’ is 
paramount in this respect. Thus, in Supreme Holy Council of Muslim Community, the ECtHR 
                                                
34 Kokkinakis, para 33.  
35 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, 13 December 2001, European Court of Human 
Rights, No. 45701/99, para. 116. 
36 Șahın, para. 114. 
37 Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and others v. Austria, 31 July 2008, European Court of Human 
Rights, No. 40825/98, para. 98; Umhuriyetçi Eğitim Ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfi v. Turkey, 2 December 2014, 
European Court of Human Rights, No. 32093/11, para. 50.  
38 Masaev v. Moldova, 12 May 2009, European Court of Human Rights, No. 6303/05, para. 26.  
 
 
found that Bulgaria had overstepped its MoA on the basis that ‘[t]he role of the authorities in 
a situation of conflict between or within religious groups is not to remove the cause of 
tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups tolerate each 
other’.39 Reference to the State’s MoA in this case does, however, appear to be unnecessary 
as the ECtHR reached a similar decision in the analogous case of Hasan and Chaush v 
Bulgaria by scrutinising the necessity of the interference under Article 9(2) ECHR without 
making reference to the MoA.40 
 
 
4  Reconciling a Clash between Individual Religious Freedom and ‘the Rights and 
Freedoms of Others’ or Other Societal Goals 
 
In addition to recognising that States have a MoA to reconcile the claims of various religious 
groups, the ECtHR has accepted that ‘regard must be had in particular to the fair balance that 
has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a 
whole, subject in any event to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State’.41 Thus, 
‘various concessions on the part of individuals or groups’ may be necessary ‘to maintain and 
promote the ideals and values of a democratic society’.42 Interference with the right to 
manifest religion in order to protect ‘the rights and freedoms of others’ falls within the scope 
of Article 9(2) ECHR. The normative MoA in this context permits States to determine the 
appropriate weight to be afforded to competing interests.  
                                                
39 Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Community v. Bulgaria, 16 December 2004, European Court of Human 
Rights, No. 39023/97, para. 96.  
40 Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, 26 October 2000, European Court of Human Rights, No. 30985/96.  
41 Eweida and others v. The United Kingdom, 15 January 2013, European Court of Human Rights, Nos. 
48420/10; 36516/10; 51671/10; 59842/10, para. 84.  
42 Șahın, para.108. 
 
 
 The nature of ‘the rights and freedom of others’ that are threatened by the individual 
manifestation of religion influences the scope of the MoA. Thus, in Eweida, the ECtHR 
prioritised the applicant’s right to manifest religion by wearing a crucifix above the 
competing right, ‘the employer’s wish to project a certain corporate image’.43 It is significant 
that the right competing with Article 9 ECHR in this case was not a recognised ‘human 
right’. A far wider MoA has been awarded to States to reconcile a perceived clash between 
freedom of religion or belief on the one hand, and LGBT rights44 or gender equality on the 
other.45 In the context of gender equality, the ECtHR has recognised that States have a 
particularly wide MoA on the basis that it is ‘one of the key principles underlying the 
Convention and a goal to be achieved by member States of the Council of Europe’.46  
 The ECtHR has also permitted States a wide MoA to pursue societal goals under ‘the 
rights and freedoms of others’, including integration policies in order to avoid ‘the emergence 
of parallel societies’.47 Furthermore, in SAS, the ECtHR accepted that the State had a wide 
margin of appreciation to pursue the aim of ‘living together’.48 In this context, the State 
appears to have a much wider MoA to resolve conflicts between the majority and religious 
minorities than it does to resolve intra-religious conflicts. For example, in SAS, the partially 
dissenting judges noted that, ‘[b]y banning the full-face veil, the French legislature ... has not 
sought to ensure tolerance between the vast majority and the small minority, but has 
prohibited what is seen as a cause of tension’.49 Thus, it can be inferred that while States must 
be impartial in relation to religious affairs, this requirement is not as onerous in relation to 
social policies that impact religious communities.  
                                                
43 Eweida, para. 94. 
44 Ibid., paras. 106, 109. 
45 Dahlab; Șahın, para.115. 
46 Șahın, ibid.  
47 Konrad v. Germany, 11 September 2006, European Court of Human Rights, No. 35504/03; Osmanoğlu and 
Kocabaş v. Switzerland, 10 January 2017, European Court of Human Rights, No. 29086/12 para. 105. 
48 SAS v. France, 1 July 2014, European Court of Human Rights, No. 43835/11, paras. 153-55. 
49 Ibid., Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom para 14; cf. Supreme Holy Council 
of the Muslim Community, para. 96. 
 
 
 The ECtHR has also accepted that States have a wide MoA to restrict proselytism in 
order to protect ‘the rights and freedoms of others’. In respect of proselytising acts by 
individuals in a personal or official capacity, States have been permitted a normative MoA to 
strike an appropriate balance between the freedom of religion of the applicant and ‘the rights 
and freedoms of others’ under Article 9(2) ECHR. The Kokkinakis case established that the 
State’s MoA in cases concerning Christian witness as opposed to ‘improper evangelism’ is 
not unlimited and subject to scrutiny.50 In Larissis, the ECtHR found that the State had struck 
the correct balance in limiting the right to proselytise, as the applicants had abused their 
position of power,51 whereas limitations on the same applicants’ right to proselytise in their 
personal capacity were found to violate Article 9.52 Notably, in Larissis, the ECtHR did not 
make reference to the State’s MoA, which suggests that resort to the MoA in these cases is, 
yet again, unnecessary.  
 This jurisprudence is somewhat complicated by the ECtHR’s acceptance that ‘the 
wearing of a headscarf might have some kind of proselytising effect’,53 regardless of whether 
the applicant is in a position of power54 or had an intention to proselytise.55 The uncritical 
acceptance by the ECtHR of the proselytising impact of the hijab can be attributed to the 
systemic MoA permitted to secular States, explored above.  
 Finally, under Article 2(1), Protocol 1, the ECtHR has established that ‘[t]he State is 
forbidden to pursue an aim of indoctrination that might be considered as not respecting 
parents’ religious and philosophical convictions’.56 However, as noted above, States also 
                                                
50 Kokkinakis, para. 48. 
51 Larissis and others v. Greece, 20 February 1998, European Court of Human Rights, No. 23372, paras. 54-55. 
52 Ibid., para. 59. 
53 Dahlab. 
54 Șahın, para. 115; Dogru, para. 64. 
55 Șahın, ibid.,, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tulkens, para. 8; Ebrahimian supra note 19, para. 71. Cf. Ahmet 
Arslan and others v. Turkey, 23 February 2010, European Court of Human Rights, No, 41135/98, para. 51. 
56 Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 7 December 1976, European Court of Human Rights, Nos. 
5095/71; 5920/72; 5926/72, para. 53.  
 
 
have a MoA in the context of historical and religious traditions.57 The presence of religion in 
the educational context is insufficient to establish that the State has overstepped the MoA 
available in this area.58 However, qualitative differences between the teaching of Christianity 
and other traditions,59 combined with an insufficient system of partial exemptions60 has led 
the ECtHR to conclude that that State had overstepped its MoA.61  
 
 
5 National Authorities are Better-Placed   
 
The ECtHR has accepted under Article 9 and Article 2 Protocol 1, that the State authorities 
are better placed to make decisions in the context of planning permission;62 social policy,63 
financial policy;64 education;65 hospitals;66 prisons;67 policing68 and identity checks.69 The 
impact of the systemic MoA in this context, often results in the ECtHR accepting the 
legitimacy of the interference with Article 9 ECHR, without scrutinizing whether the 
restriction was proportionate. Thus, in Chaplin, concerning the failure of a hospital to 
accommodate the wearing of crucifix, the ECtHR held, ‘[t]he hospital managers were better 
placed to make decisions about clinical safety than a court, particularly an international court 
                                                
57 Folgerø, para. 89.  
58 Lautsi, para. 66. 
59 Folgerø, para. 95. 
60 Ibid., paras. 97-100 
61 Further on cases judged under Protocol 1, Article 2, see the article by Temperman in this same issue. 
62 Johannische Kirche & Peters v. Germany, 10 July 2001, European Court of Human Rights, No. 41754/98. 
63 Konrad; Osmanoǧlu and Kocabaş, para.105; SAS, paras. 153-55. 
64 Alujer Fernandez and Caballero Garcia v. Spain, 14 July 2001, European Court of Human Rights, No. 
53072/99; Church Of Jesus Christ Of Latter-Day Saints v. the United Kingdom, 4 March 2014, European Court 
of Human Rights, No. 7552/09, para. 33. 
65 Folgerø, para. 89; Lautsi, para. 69. 
66 Eweida, para. 99; Ebrahimian, supra note 19, para. 65. 
67 Jakóbski v. Poland, 7 December 2010, European Court of Human Rights, No. 18429/06, para. 47; Vartic v. 
Romania (no 2), 17 December 2013, European Court of Human Rights, No. 14150/08, para. 45.  
68 Karaahmed v. Bulgaria, 24 February 2015, European Court of Human Rights, No, 30587/13, para. 105. 
69 Mann Singh v. France, 11 January 2009, European Court of Human Rights, No 24479/07; El Morsli v. 
France, 4 March 2008, European Court of Human Rights, No. 15585/06. 
 
 
which has heard no direct evidence’.70 Similarly, on the basis of the State’s wide MoA in 
planning matters, 71 the ECtHR did not consider whether the denial of planning permission 
for a place of worship was discriminatory.72 The danger inherent in this systemic MoA is 
particularly apparent in SAS v France.73 Although the ECtHR expressed unease with the so-
called burqa ban,74 the MoA prevented if from questioning the legitimacy of the democratic 
decision-making process. 75  
 The ECtHR has, nonetheless, adopted a narrower MoA in cases concerning the 
protection of freedom of religion or belief when the State has failed to comply with its 
positive obligation to secure the rights contained in the Convention.76 Thus, although in 
Karaahmed v Bulgaria the ECtHR accepted that the State had a wide MoA in relation to 
‘operational matters’ pertaining to policing, the failure of the police to prevent demonstrators 
from interfering with religious worship meant than the State had not struck an appropriate 
balance between the rights of protesters and Article 9 ECHR.77  
 Thus, it appears that in cases concerning politically sensitive issues, the ECtHR uses 
the systemic MoA (on the basis of democracy or democratic principles such as secularism) to 
avoid scutinising the legitimacy of the interference with the individual applicant’s religious 
freedom. In contrast, the level of expertise of the national authorities does not always give 
rise to the same level of discretion, if the State has failed to comply with its positive 
obligations. While in the context of hospitals and planning permission the ECtHR has 
uncritically accepted restrictions on religious freedom, in cases concerning policing and 
                                                
70 Eweida, para. 99.  
71 Johannische Kirche.  
72 Stephanie E. Berry, ‘A Tale of Two Instruments: Religious Minorities and the Council of Europe’s Rights 
Regime’, 30 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights (2012), p. 24.  
73 SAS, para. 122.  
74 Ibid., para. 149.  
75 Ibid., paras. 88, 154. 
76 Jakóbski, para. 46; Karaahmed, para. 111. 
77 Karaahmed, ibid, paras. 105, 111.  
 
 
prisons, the State has a positive obligation to secure the rights in the Convention and, thus, 





The ECtHR has consistently recognised that States have a MoA in cases concerning the right 
to manifest religion. Under the normative MoA, the ECtHR usually scrutinises the necessity 
of the interference with the applicant’s rights. Thus, although it allows States some discretion 
to decide whether an appropriate balance has been struck between individual freedoms and 
‘the rights and freedoms of others’ or other societal goals, this discretion is not absolute. The 
use of the MoA in these cases does not always appear to be strictly necessary, as the ECtHR 
already allows States discretion when analysing the proportionality of the restriction under 
Article 9(2) ECHR.  
 In contrast, the systemic MoA appears to be much wider. In cases concerning 
secularism, democracy and the expertise of national authorities, the ECtHR has frequently 
approached the justification for the restriction on the applicant’s rights as unproblematic. This 
precludes it from considering whether ‘hostile-external preferences’78 are at play. This level 
of deference has the potential to be particularly problematic in instances where the religious 
freedom of unpopular minorities is limited. 
                                                
78 Letsas, supra note 11, p. 729. 
